I have recently finished reading Danielle Trussoni's Falling Through The Earth. I find myself comparing it to Farley Mowat's And No Bird Sang and to Tony Hillerman's Seldom Disappointed. Born in 1973, Ms Trussoni has essentially written a Vietnam war memoir. Her father served with the 25th Infantry Division arriving in Vietnam in Febuary 1968. The Tet Offensive had begun on January 30th of that year. At that point, it was clear to the US leadership, if not publicly acknowledged, that the war was no longer winnable, if it ever was, in any common understanding of the concept of victory.
How does one write their father's war memoir? The war is brought home and given to one's children. It is not something one sets out to do; it is the nature of war. It is not the childhood that one chooses; it is the nature of such families.
Maybe it is time to reread Stephen Crane's The Red Badge of Courage, even though it is a novel and not a memoir and the author only experienced combat later as a war correspondent.
Thursday, December 18, 2014
Monday, December 15, 2014
Talking heads--self-styled or considered experts--making the rounds on cable news shows to comment on the Senate Torture Report make such statements as: "They were only doing what we asked them to do." "We had a presidential finding." "We had legal assurances that these activities were lawful." "I was only a lieutenant colonel."
Why is it that no one references the Geneva Convention and the Nuremberg Principles? Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention prohibits "cruel treatment and torture." Cruel treatment and torture are listed among the "grave breaches," that is, the most serious of violations of the norms for warfare. Principle III of the Nuremberg Principles states that no "Head of State" or "responsible Government official" can claim exemption from their responsibility under International Law. Principle IV states: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him." Principle VI does not use the term torture; it uses a more general term--"ill treatment of prisoners"--in its listing of war crimes. Parsing the term torture is not supported by the language of these norms. Neither is the use of a misleading construction, such as "enhanced interrogation technique."
Army basic training in 1970 included instruction on this subject. It was made very clear that each individual soldier is personally responsible for his actions and for determining the propriety of any proposed course of action. One could not claim the authorization of a superior officer or a governmental official, e.g. the president of the United States, in an attempt to avoid personal and individual legal responsibility. This applied not only to a lieutenant colonel, O-5, but also to the lowest private, E-1. It was also made clear that exercising this responsibility would very likely place the individual soldier in a precarious position. Compliance with an order to engage in an action, which one determines to be a violation of the Geneva Convention, exposes one to criminal sanctions. Refusal to comply with the direct order of a superior also exposes one to criminal sanctions. The implied, that is, not clearly stated, remedy to this dilemma is to insure that everyone participates in the activity, so that all have a shared self-interest in preventing disclosure. Group identity and group cohesion are the keys to personal survival and the avoidance of legal consequences. This proposed remedy may reduce the risks of legal consequences, but it may do nothing to protect one from the moral consequences.
Curiously, the qualifying phrase "provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him" wasn't included in the 1970 discussion. What would the circumstances have to be wherein "a moral choice" is "not possible"?
Why is it that no one references the Geneva Convention and the Nuremberg Principles? Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention prohibits "cruel treatment and torture." Cruel treatment and torture are listed among the "grave breaches," that is, the most serious of violations of the norms for warfare. Principle III of the Nuremberg Principles states that no "Head of State" or "responsible Government official" can claim exemption from their responsibility under International Law. Principle IV states: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him." Principle VI does not use the term torture; it uses a more general term--"ill treatment of prisoners"--in its listing of war crimes. Parsing the term torture is not supported by the language of these norms. Neither is the use of a misleading construction, such as "enhanced interrogation technique."
Army basic training in 1970 included instruction on this subject. It was made very clear that each individual soldier is personally responsible for his actions and for determining the propriety of any proposed course of action. One could not claim the authorization of a superior officer or a governmental official, e.g. the president of the United States, in an attempt to avoid personal and individual legal responsibility. This applied not only to a lieutenant colonel, O-5, but also to the lowest private, E-1. It was also made clear that exercising this responsibility would very likely place the individual soldier in a precarious position. Compliance with an order to engage in an action, which one determines to be a violation of the Geneva Convention, exposes one to criminal sanctions. Refusal to comply with the direct order of a superior also exposes one to criminal sanctions. The implied, that is, not clearly stated, remedy to this dilemma is to insure that everyone participates in the activity, so that all have a shared self-interest in preventing disclosure. Group identity and group cohesion are the keys to personal survival and the avoidance of legal consequences. This proposed remedy may reduce the risks of legal consequences, but it may do nothing to protect one from the moral consequences.
Curiously, the qualifying phrase "provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him" wasn't included in the 1970 discussion. What would the circumstances have to be wherein "a moral choice" is "not possible"?
Tuesday, December 9, 2014
I am not really comfortable where I ended up as I concluded the posting of December 7th. Maybe I was giving Pope Francis a pass by distinguishing between the language of evangelization and the language of theology. Such a distinction is in conflict with my earlier statement in that post: "At some level all language and speech is metaphorical." Furthermore, such a distinction may not be possible or, if possible, it is only a matter of degree. I am reminded of something I read by Karen Armstrong as she defined Logos and Mythos. Logos is the realm of fact and the observable. Mythos is the arena of faith; it is not observable, but it is believable. She then states that any and all discussion of Mythos is possible only by analogy. From this perspective, both the language of evangelization and the language of theology are analogy, metaphor, simile, allegory, and parable.
A central element in the concept that underpins these five words is the use of a known to elucidate an unknown, the use of the concrete to expound upon an abstraction, and the suggestion of additional similarities between things with known or acknowledged similarities. The connections made or suggested in discussions using these tools of language are socially and culturally determined. They may also reflect highly individualistic perceptions of self, views of the environment, and perceptions of the unseen.
Where am I going with this? Where does this take me?
The question that arises for me is: "How does one identify or establish the terminal religious authority, that is, the last word in all things?" To postulate that one has the fullness of the Truth is to claim a status for one's own analogy, metaphor, simile, allegory, or parable and to deny any comparable status for all others. It is no different than an English speaker claiming superiority of language over a Japanese or Ojibwe speaker. One language may be more universal than another, but that does not mean it is better equipped to perform as a tool of communication.
To my knowledge, Pope Francis has not stated that the Catholic Church possesses the fullness of the Truth. Others certainly have; others in any numbers of religious traditions. Is it possible to interpret Pope Francis' ecumenical efforts as an acknowledgement of shared truth and an incomplete possession on the part of any and all? Is it possible to speak candidly of such things? Or is it simply too dangerous? Are we fearful that the other will perceive our position as weakness and capitalization? Can't Truth be better served?
Am I once more giving Pope Francis a pass? Or has he chosen a different path than many of his predecessors and contemporaries?
A central element in the concept that underpins these five words is the use of a known to elucidate an unknown, the use of the concrete to expound upon an abstraction, and the suggestion of additional similarities between things with known or acknowledged similarities. The connections made or suggested in discussions using these tools of language are socially and culturally determined. They may also reflect highly individualistic perceptions of self, views of the environment, and perceptions of the unseen.
Where am I going with this? Where does this take me?
The question that arises for me is: "How does one identify or establish the terminal religious authority, that is, the last word in all things?" To postulate that one has the fullness of the Truth is to claim a status for one's own analogy, metaphor, simile, allegory, or parable and to deny any comparable status for all others. It is no different than an English speaker claiming superiority of language over a Japanese or Ojibwe speaker. One language may be more universal than another, but that does not mean it is better equipped to perform as a tool of communication.
To my knowledge, Pope Francis has not stated that the Catholic Church possesses the fullness of the Truth. Others certainly have; others in any numbers of religious traditions. Is it possible to interpret Pope Francis' ecumenical efforts as an acknowledgement of shared truth and an incomplete possession on the part of any and all? Is it possible to speak candidly of such things? Or is it simply too dangerous? Are we fearful that the other will perceive our position as weakness and capitalization? Can't Truth be better served?
Am I once more giving Pope Francis a pass? Or has he chosen a different path than many of his predecessors and contemporaries?
Sunday, December 7, 2014
Just because I haven't been making entries in this blog does not mean that I haven't been thinking.
A statement by a news commentator got me thinking. The statement went something like this: "Pope Francis has never met a metaphor he didn't like." That statement reminded me of a quote attributed of Max Muller: "Mythology or religion is a disease of language" by which he meant that "words constructed to express abstract ideas...were transformed into imagined personalities." (Wikipedia) The disease (as metaphor) is the failure to acknowledge the limits of a metaphor. A metaphor is not a literal truth or observable fact. It aids in the understanding of that which it is attributed to "like" or "as." The former is typically an observable fact or entity which is intended as an aide in our standing of the latter that is not observable--an abstract reality or belief. Strictly speaking, the presence of "like" or "as" makes it a simile, rather than a metaphor. Please bear with me.
A metaphor may fail on either of two fronts: (1) the expression is not acknowledged as metaphor, and (2) the metaphor is used to convey a truth or bolster a position beyond its scope. Examples of the first are statements such as: The church is the body of Christ. The church is our mother. The church is the bride of Christ. In common speech, metaphorical statements typically contain the word "as" or "like," which can alert the listener. Religious or theological statements most often skip the qualifier, and the metaphor is at risk of creating confusion as the listener interprets the statements literally. An example of extending a metaphor beyond its scope would be describing water polo like ice hockey and proceeding then to use that statement as a rationale to support the use of hockey sticks in water polo. In this example, the metaphor is being "over mined," that is, stretched beyond any reasonable limit resulting in error and confusion--the very things the metaphor was initially employed to counter or avoid. The reasonable limits of a metaphor may be moreorless readily evident when one is comparing observable phenomena, but they are often not clear when one entity is an abstraction, a conceptualization, or a belief.
The starting point in the discussion of the metaphysical and abstract must acknowledge the use of metaphor in the subsequent discussion, be willing to explore the limits and inadequacies of any and all metaphors, and be open to the metaphors of others arising out of valid linguistic and cultural differences. At some level all language and speech is metaphorical.
Returning to Pope Francis, I can sympathize with those who have criticized some of the Pope's statements as contributing to confusion. I think the terminology employed by the Pope speaks of a language of evangelization versus a language of theology. He clearly prefers the former to the latter. Yet both are valid vehicles of communication; each has their own road on which to travel. Co-mingling them or misconstruing or misusing one as the other will result in confused and diseased communication. Or in keeping with the vehicle/road metaphor, such misuse will result in head-on collisions and other fatal and very avoidable accidents.
A statement by a news commentator got me thinking. The statement went something like this: "Pope Francis has never met a metaphor he didn't like." That statement reminded me of a quote attributed of Max Muller: "Mythology or religion is a disease of language" by which he meant that "words constructed to express abstract ideas...were transformed into imagined personalities." (Wikipedia) The disease (as metaphor) is the failure to acknowledge the limits of a metaphor. A metaphor is not a literal truth or observable fact. It aids in the understanding of that which it is attributed to "like" or "as." The former is typically an observable fact or entity which is intended as an aide in our standing of the latter that is not observable--an abstract reality or belief. Strictly speaking, the presence of "like" or "as" makes it a simile, rather than a metaphor. Please bear with me.
A metaphor may fail on either of two fronts: (1) the expression is not acknowledged as metaphor, and (2) the metaphor is used to convey a truth or bolster a position beyond its scope. Examples of the first are statements such as: The church is the body of Christ. The church is our mother. The church is the bride of Christ. In common speech, metaphorical statements typically contain the word "as" or "like," which can alert the listener. Religious or theological statements most often skip the qualifier, and the metaphor is at risk of creating confusion as the listener interprets the statements literally. An example of extending a metaphor beyond its scope would be describing water polo like ice hockey and proceeding then to use that statement as a rationale to support the use of hockey sticks in water polo. In this example, the metaphor is being "over mined," that is, stretched beyond any reasonable limit resulting in error and confusion--the very things the metaphor was initially employed to counter or avoid. The reasonable limits of a metaphor may be moreorless readily evident when one is comparing observable phenomena, but they are often not clear when one entity is an abstraction, a conceptualization, or a belief.
The starting point in the discussion of the metaphysical and abstract must acknowledge the use of metaphor in the subsequent discussion, be willing to explore the limits and inadequacies of any and all metaphors, and be open to the metaphors of others arising out of valid linguistic and cultural differences. At some level all language and speech is metaphorical.
Returning to Pope Francis, I can sympathize with those who have criticized some of the Pope's statements as contributing to confusion. I think the terminology employed by the Pope speaks of a language of evangelization versus a language of theology. He clearly prefers the former to the latter. Yet both are valid vehicles of communication; each has their own road on which to travel. Co-mingling them or misconstruing or misusing one as the other will result in confused and diseased communication. Or in keeping with the vehicle/road metaphor, such misuse will result in head-on collisions and other fatal and very avoidable accidents.
Wednesday, November 5, 2014
Here it is the morning after an election day, and I am left with trying to understand the subtlety of the American voter or the disconnect in the political judgment of that same voter.
When given the opportunity to vote on policy, yesterday's election outcomes point to a liberal bent on the part of the voting public. This is evident in support for raising the wage, the expansion of medical assistance programs, the legalization of marijuana, and background checks for firearm purchases, and the lack of support for person-hood legislation. Yet when it came to voting for candidates, those typically described as conservative won overwhelmingly. What are the prospects that GOP dominated state and federal legislative bodies will pass legislation consistent with the referendum questions supported by the voting public? Why would one hire an individual to perform a task that the individual has no interest in or desire to see through to completion?
It has often been said that the American voter does not vote in his/her own interest. I am not so sure. There certainly are single issue voters, where one issue trumps all others. There may also be cults of personality, where an individual candidate is favored, irrespective of his/her position on any or all issues. What is it about Democratic candidates that render them unappealing to that modest percentage of total voters that could make for a very different election outcomes?
When given the opportunity to vote on policy, yesterday's election outcomes point to a liberal bent on the part of the voting public. This is evident in support for raising the wage, the expansion of medical assistance programs, the legalization of marijuana, and background checks for firearm purchases, and the lack of support for person-hood legislation. Yet when it came to voting for candidates, those typically described as conservative won overwhelmingly. What are the prospects that GOP dominated state and federal legislative bodies will pass legislation consistent with the referendum questions supported by the voting public? Why would one hire an individual to perform a task that the individual has no interest in or desire to see through to completion?
It has often been said that the American voter does not vote in his/her own interest. I am not so sure. There certainly are single issue voters, where one issue trumps all others. There may also be cults of personality, where an individual candidate is favored, irrespective of his/her position on any or all issues. What is it about Democratic candidates that render them unappealing to that modest percentage of total voters that could make for a very different election outcomes?
Friday, October 17, 2014
“Well religious beliefs aren’t reasonable. I mean, religious beliefs are categorical. You know, it’s God tells you. It’s not a matter of being reasonable. God be reasonable?"
The above is a recent quote of Supreme Court Justice A. Scalia, which haunts me as I read articles on the discussions and published summaries of the Vatican Synod of Bishops currently in session. Within the context of the Supreme Court and, by inference, the whole of the criminal justice system, many actors are convinced that a sincerely held belief is a sufficient basis for acting contrary to the law of the land with impunity. On the other hand, the good bishops make repeated claims to nature, natural law, the natural order, revelation, and reasonableness in order to provide support for a variety of moral and ethical stances. In addition, the tools of inductive and/or deductive reasoning are to get us or at least "all men of goodwill" to a singular position on such matters. (The sexist phrase has been chosen with intent.)
I would like to hear a comment from Cardinals Dolan or Burke on Justice Scalia's statement. Is there a way to bridge this divide?
I also can't help but think, "Wouldn't Scalia make one crazy bishop?"
The above is a recent quote of Supreme Court Justice A. Scalia, which haunts me as I read articles on the discussions and published summaries of the Vatican Synod of Bishops currently in session. Within the context of the Supreme Court and, by inference, the whole of the criminal justice system, many actors are convinced that a sincerely held belief is a sufficient basis for acting contrary to the law of the land with impunity. On the other hand, the good bishops make repeated claims to nature, natural law, the natural order, revelation, and reasonableness in order to provide support for a variety of moral and ethical stances. In addition, the tools of inductive and/or deductive reasoning are to get us or at least "all men of goodwill" to a singular position on such matters. (The sexist phrase has been chosen with intent.)
I would like to hear a comment from Cardinals Dolan or Burke on Justice Scalia's statement. Is there a way to bridge this divide?
I also can't help but think, "Wouldn't Scalia make one crazy bishop?"
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